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1201 
Gubernatorial Discretion Not Advised 
THE CASE FOR SPECIAL ELECTIONS TO FILL 
SENATE VACANCIES 
With the United States at war with itself and its very 
existence teetering on the brink of collapse, commander-in-chief 
Abraham Lincoln stood before a group of soldiers at a military 
cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and declared that 
“government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth.”1 Inherent in this democratic ideal was the 
principle that “the people should choose whom they please to 
govern them. . . . [P]opular election, should be perfectly pure, and 
the most unbounded liberty allowed.”2 Today, this liberty is often 
taken for granted. We flex our democratic muscles in voting for 
everything from our Presidents, congressmen, and governors, to 
our corporate directors, local school boards, reality show winners, 
and top plays of the day in the world of sports. Yet the ability to 
choose our leaders, a staple of our democratic society and 
republican government, has only received the benefit of 
constitutional protection for a relatively short span of time. The 
Fifteenth Amendment, which precluded states from denying the 
right to vote on the basis of race, was not made a part of our 
Constitution until 1870.3 Women would have to wait another fifty 
years for the Nineteenth Amendment to guarantee that the 
government could not restrict the right to vote on the basis of 
sex.4 The democratic impediment of a poll tax was not removed 
from the voting booths until passage of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment in 1964.5 And it wasn’t until 1971, with ratification 
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, that young men and women old 
enough to go to war were permitted to choose their 
representatives responsible for sending them there.6 It has taken 
  
 1 President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 2 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 795 (1995) (quoting 
Alexander Hamilton). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 4 Id. amend. XIX. 
 5 Id. amend. XXIV. 
 6 Id. amend. XXVI. 
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Congress and the States the better part of the past two hundred 
years to recognize, as the Supreme Court has, that suffrage is a 
fundamental right, and a crucial linchpin of our democracy. 
The right to elect our representatives in the Senate was 
not established until 1913, with ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment. Prior to 1913, senators were constitutionally 
required to be appointed by the legislatures of their respective 
states.7 Beginning in the early nineteenth century, a movement 
was underway, comprised of reformers who believed that “the 
direct vote was the inalienable right of every citizen,” to remove 
the choice of senator from the discretion of the state 
lawmakers.8 What emerged from this nearly century-long effort 
was an amendment with a crystal clear democratic purpose to 
put into the hands of the people the right to choose their 
leaders.9 However, in the years since ratification, an inherent 
flaw has come to light that has served to undermine the 
original purpose of the amendment.  
Immediately after vesting in the people the right to elect 
their senators, the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment set 
forth the procedures by which vacancies should be filled. This 
section of the amendment reads: 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the 
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of 
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any 
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary 
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the 
legislature may direct.10 
In one swift action, the drafters took the power of 
appointment, originally granted to the state legislatures, and 
conveyed it to the state executives in instances where a Senate 
seat becomes vacant.11 However, the amendment does not grant 
appointment powers to the governors directly. Rather, it is in 
the discretion of each state legislature to decide whether to 
grant appointment power to the governor, or to require the 
  
 7 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 8 C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY 50 (Transaction 
Publishers 1995). 
 9 Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629, 637 (1991). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 11 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial 
Power to Make Temporary Appointments to the United States Senate Constitutional 
Under the Seventeenth Amendment?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 729-30 (2008). 
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governor instead to order that special elections take place.12 
Thus, while the Seventeenth Amendment produced a uniform 
method for the election of senators throughout the country, it 
also created an inconsistent framework for their replacement 
upon early departures from Capitol Hill. In turn, the vacancy 
mechanism of the Seventeenth Amendment has produced a 
slate of chaotic and often antidemocratic results.  
Part I of this note documents recent events that have 
brought this previously obscure issue into the national 
spotlight. Part II provides a historical background of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, detailing the movement that led to 
its ratification and the three central concerns motivating its 
supporters. Part III focuses on the evils confronted by the 
framers of the Seventeenth Amendment and uses current 
examples to show that these same issues remain prevalent 
today. Finally, Part IV details the need for a constitutional 
amendment to remedy the current flaws in our democracy. This 
note ultimately concludes that in order to resolve the current 
democratic crisis surrounding gubernatorial appointments, 
special elections must be constitutionally mandated whenever 
a vacancy in the U.S. Senate arises.  
I. THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC CRISIS 
In recent years, a string of infamous events have 
occurred that have undermined the modern democratic 
principles established by the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Antidemocratic forces in our national politics have wrested 
away the people’s right to choose their leaders and have 
subsequently eroded the public’s trust in its own government. 
One must look no further than to recent events in 
Massachusetts, where the death of Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy reignited age-old debates that surrounded the 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. After Senator 
Kennedy’s death on August 25, 2009, arguments ensued over 
how to fill his vacant Massachusetts Senate seat.13 Existing law 
in the state prescribed that: 
[T]he governor shall immediately cause precepts to be issued to the 
aldermen in every city and the selectmen in every town in the 
district, directing them to call an election on the day appointed . . . . 
  
 12 See, e.g., id. 
 13 Kennedy’s Seat May Remain Empty for Months, CNN.COM (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/26/kennedy.replacement/index.html. 
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[which] shall not be more than 160 nor less than 145 days after the 
date that a vacancy is created . . . .14  
State law therefore mandated that the seat remain empty 
until a replacement could be chosen by the people in a special 
election that was to be held no sooner than 145 days after August 
25, the date of the Senator’s death. However, the timing of the 
vacancy and the national political climate served to transform 
the issue into a partisan tug-of-war. The loss of Senator Kennedy 
dropped Democratic representation in the Senate from sixty to 
fifty-nine, thereby denying Democrats the ability to block a 
Republican filibuster.15 Furthermore, the vacancy arrived at a 
time when the debate over national health care reform had 
reached a crescendo, with television screens rolling footage of 
town hall protestors spewing angry barbs at elected officials.16 In 
a posthumous letter addressed to both Massachusetts Governor 
Deval Patrick and the state legislature, Senator Kennedy made a 
public request to have his successor appointed by the governor.17 
With critical legislation hanging in the balance and their 
supermajority in the Senate in jeopardy, President Obama’s 
administration exerted its own pressure on the state legislature 
to change its procedures to allow Governor Patrick to fill the 
empty seat before a special election could be held.18  
This put Massachusetts Democrats in the awkward 
position of amending a law that they were responsible for having 
created just five years earlier. While Massachusetts Senator 
John Kerry was campaigning for the Presidency in 2004, state 
Democrats feared Republican Governor Mitt Romney would 
appoint a member of his own party to succeed the candidate.19 To 
prevent this scenario from taking place, the Democrats amended 
the statute to require that special elections be held whenever 
Senate vacancies arise.20 Any notion that this change was 
motivated by democratic ideals in the spirit of the Seventeenth 
  
 14 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (2004). 
 15 Glen Johnson, Kennedy Loyalist Tapped as Senate Replacement, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wires/2009/09/24/mass-governor-set-
to-name_ws_297986.html. 
 16 Philip Rucker & Dan Eggen, Protests at Democrats’ Health-Care Events Spark 
Political Tug of War, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/05/AR2009080502780.html. 
 17 James Oliphant, Kennedy Asks Massachusetts to Change Successor Rules, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009. 
 18 Johnson, supra note 15. 
 19 Michael Falcone, Massachusetts Democrats Wary of Kennedy Law Change, 
POLITICO.COM (Sep. 12, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27066.html. 
 20 Id. 
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Amendment was refuted in 2009, when the Democrats once 
again changed the law to allow for temporary gubernatorial 
appointments, thereby clearing the way for Governor Patrick to 
name Democrat Paul Kirk Jr. as Kennedy’s successor.21 
Less than a year earlier, Illinois’s vacancy procedures 
were the focus of national attention as a replacement was 
sought to fill the seat left by Barack Obama’s ascendency to the 
White House. According to state law, the seat was to be filled 
by “the Governor [who] shall make [a] temporary appointment 
to fill such vacancy until the next election of representatives in 
Congress, at which time such vacancy shall be filled by 
election . . . .”22 Thus, the ability to choose the people’s 
representative was left exclusively to the discretion of Governor 
Rod Blagojevich.23 As part of a wide-ranging investigation into 
allegations of corruption against the governor, federal wiretaps 
revealed Blagojevich leveraging the seat to secure future 
campaign donations and postpolitical employment 
opportunities.24 Fearing that he would exercise his statutory 
duty to appoint a senator, federal authorities ended the sting 
and arrested the governor before the country could find out 
what a seat in the Senate was actually worth.25 Incredibly, 
amid federal indictment and public outcry, Blagojevich sent a 
letter to the President of the Senate of the United States 
certifying his selection of Roland Burris to fill the vacant seat.26 
After the Illinois Supreme Court deemed the appointment 
valid, Senate Democrats backed down from their initial threats 
to blockade Burris and allowed him to be seated.27 Not 
  
 21 Johnson, supra note 15. On January 19, 2010, the people finally had their say. 
To the nation’s shock, they elected Republican Scott Brown to fill what had been a 
Democratic seat for the previous forty-seven years. Matt Viser & Andrea Estes, Big Win 
for Brown, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/ 
articles/2010/01/20/republican_trounces_coakley_for_senate_imperils_obama_health_plan. 
 22 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (2009).  
 23 Brian Ross, FBI: Illinois Governor Sought to “Sell” Obama’s Seat, ABC 
NEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ConductUnbecoming/story?id= 
6424985&page=1. 
 24 Michael Scherer, Governor Gone Wild: The Blagojevich Scandal, TIME.COM 
(Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1865781-1,00.html. Governor 
Blagojevich was caught on tape stating “I’m just not giving it up for . . . nothing” and 
lamenting the fact that President Obama’s allies were “not willing to give me anything 
except appreciation.” Id.  
 25 Id. 
 26 Burris v. White, 901 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Ill. 2009). 
 27 Z. Byron Wolf, Jonathan Karl & Kate Barrett, U.S. Senate Will Seat 
Roland Burris, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id 
=6631014&page=1. 
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surprisingly, a poll released months after his term began 
revealed Burris to have a pathetic 17% approval rating, the 
lowest of any sitting U.S. Senator.28 While the scandal 
surrounding his appointment must have been a substantial 
factor in the apparent lack of faith on the part of his 
constituents, the democratically flawed method by which he 
was chosen could not be overlooked either. 
The gubernatorial appointment of Senator Lisa 
Murkowski of Alaska in 2002 provides another outrageous 
example of the Seventeenth Amendment’s flawed vacancy 
provision. Senator Frank Murkowski, having served as 
Alaska’s senator for twenty-two years, resigned his post to 
become the governor of the state.29 Murkowski, “to the disgust 
of many Alaskans,” chose his own daughter to fill his seat in 
the Senate.30 Underscoring the inherent faults with this 
nepotistic selection, the newly appointed senator held 
divergent views from her father on two major political issues: 
abortion and tax reform.31 Gubernatorial appointments that 
keep the seat within the same political party are justified by 
some on grounds that they are consistent with the wishes of 
the constituents and thereby replicate their will until they can 
vote in the next election.32 In the case of the Murkowski family, 
although father and daughter were members of the same party, 
their political views were arguably too incongruous to construe 
the selection as an adequate reflection of the will of the people. 
Outrage over the appointment spilled over to the next election 
in 2004, when a ballot initiative was put forth to require 
special elections when a vacancy in the Senate occurs.33 After 
the ballot initiative passed, it was interpreted by the Alaska 
  
 28 Senate Approval Ratings, POLITICO.COM (May 22, 2009), http://www.politico. 
com/blogs/scorecard/0509/Senate_approval_ratings.html. 
 29 Katharine Q. Seelye, New Alaska Governor Gives Daughter His Seat in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/us/ 
new-alaska-governor-gives-daughter-his-seat-in-senate.html. 
 30 Sanford Levinson, Political Party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to 
Vikram Amar on How Best to Interpret the Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 713, 720 (2008) (quoting Blaine Harden, Senator Murkowski’s Big 
Problem: Dad the Governor, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2004, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52838-2004Aug9.html). 
 31 Seelye, supra note 29. 
 32 Amar, supra note 11, at 753-58 (discussing Arizona’s statute that requires 
the governor to choose a member of the departed senator’s party to fill the Senate 
vacancy until the next election). 
 33 Alaska Judge Orders 500,000 Ballots Reprinted, Redistributed for Nov. 2 
Election, USATODAY.COM (Sep. 29, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/ 
state/alaska/2004-09-29-ballots_x.htm. 
2011] GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION NOT ADVISED 1207 
Supreme Court to have “eliminat[ed] gubernatorial 
appointments from the process of filling [S]enate vacancies.”34  
In New York, the appointment made by Governor David 
Patterson to fill the vacant Senate seat of Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton was likewise tarnished by “its share of 
acrimony.”35 While there were no allegations of political 
misplay, the process to find a successor took weeks and was 
seen by critics as “a careful political calculation” by a governor 
who was presumed to be running for re-election in 2010.36 Not 
only did Governor Patterson’s selection offer New Yorkers the 
unsavory scenario of having a loosely elected governor appoint 
an unelected senator,37 but it also reflected the danger posed by 
the mixture of state and national politics. When the two are 
combined, government roles and accountability become 
confused, leaving the people misrepresented on both levels of 
government.38 This issue was a major impetus that led to 
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.39  
Though unseemly gubernatorial appointments may have 
damaging political repercussions for the parties involved,40 they 
have, with the potential exception of Governor Blagojevich,41 not 
  
 34 State v. Trust the People, 113 P.3d 613, 614 (Alaska 2005). Interestingly, 
Senator Lisa Murkowski won a surprise re-election bid as a write-in candidate in 2010. 
William Yardley, Murkowski Wins Alaska Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/politics/18alaska.html. Thus, it appears the voters’ 
anger had little to do with the choice of senator, but rather the method by which she was 
chosen. 
 35 Emily Friedman, Feingold Seeks Change in Empty Senate Seat Protocol, 
ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6734789&page=1. 
 36 Javier C. Hernandez, Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Patterson Announces 
Choice of Gillebrand for Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2009/01/24/nyregion/24choice.html. Ultimately, Governor Patterson decided 
not to seek a second term. Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Under Fire, Patterson Ends 
His Campaign for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2010/02/27/nyregion/27paterson.html.  
 37 Governor Patterson was elected as New York’s Lieutenant Governor, and 
ascended to the Governor’s mansion upon the downfall of Governor Elliot Spitzer, who 
resigned amid scandal surrounding his involvement in a prostitution ring. Michael M. 
Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign.html.  
 38 Roger G. Brooks, Note, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of 
the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 200 (1987). 
 39 See Virginia M. McInerney, Federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment, 7 
J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 153, 169 (1988); see also Brooks, supra note 38, at 207. 
 40 See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
 41 Blagojevich’s trial for attempting to sell President Obama’s Senate seat 
ended in a mistrial, though federal prosecutors have announced their intention to retry 
the former governor. Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich, Guilty on 1 of 24 
Counts, Faces Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/18/us/18jury.html. 
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run afoul of the law. In fact, the Supreme Court affirmed and 
upheld one of the more egregious uses of the appointment power 
against a Seventeenth Amendment challenge brought by voters 
in the state of New York.42 With the legality of gubernatorial 
appointments largely a settled issue, the door remains open for 
the types of scandals and political chicanery which have been 
commonplace in recent years. Therefore, a state like 
Massachusetts can choose to have the governor appoint a 
successor in years where the executive and legislative branch 
are controlled by the same party, and subsequently amend the 
law to require special elections in years where no such 
alignment exists. Vacancies can continue to be filled according to 
political loyalties and special interests rather than as an 
accurate reflection of the will of the people. However, while these 
practices may not be in violation of the law, they are at odds 
with the goals and spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment, 
discussed in the next Part of this note. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
Although the Seventeenth Amendment was not enacted 
until 1913, the campaign to remove the power of appointment 
from the state legislature and open the Senate to direct 
elections began nearly a century earlier. Reformers intended 
the Seventeenth Amendment to tackle three main obstacles 
that were threatening the legitimacy and efficacy of the 
democratic system. 
A. Road to the Seventeenth Amendment 
The campaign to make the Senate directly accountable 
to the people spanned nearly an entire century, beginning with 
an initial proposal in 1826 and continuing through the ultimate 
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.43 The 
proposed reform was first introduced into the public debate just 
two years after the presidential election of 1824, the first of its 
kind to utilize the popular vote.44 Yet it would take another 
  
 42 See Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 
393 U.S. 405 (1969); see infra notes 224-35 and accompanying text. 
 43 RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 183 
(Lexington Books 2001); Little, supra note 9, at 636. 
 44 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 85. 
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eighty-six years of debate and 187 resolutions in Congress to 
produce an amendment that would extend direct elections to 
senatorial contests.45 Throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, there was a steady drumbeat of 
democratic fervor sweeping the country, and the direct election 
of senators would become the crowning achievement of the 
broader movement for direct democracy. By 1912, the Senate 
could no longer drag its feet against the momentum of the 
people.  
The shift towards direct democracy was already 
underway in the mid-nineteenth century, when states removed 
property qualifications from the right to suffrage, thereby 
opening the vote to all white males above the age of twenty-
one.46 Later that century, in an effort to make their 
governments more “responsive” to the people, some states 
began to implement popular referendums and ballot initiatives 
designed to ease the process by which their constitutions could 
be amended.47 According to Senate historian George Haynes, 
the expansion of suffrage, the widespread use of the 
referendum, and the addition of elective offices formed a larger 
movement to “democratize American government,” a movement 
that would later spawn the Seventeenth Amendment.48  
The end of the nineteenth century produced two events 
that would serve as important triumphs for the direct democracy 
movement and ultimately break the will of those senators 
resistant to constitutional change. First was the advent of the 
senatorial primary election system, introduced by Nebraska in 
1875.49 However, these initial primaries proved to be little more 
than recommendations, as the state legislatures were not legally 
bound to honor the wishes of their constituents by appointing 
the election winner.50 Thus, in 1904, the people of Oregon 
invented the “Oregon System,” whereby candidates for state 
  
 45 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 183. Measures for direct elections were far 
better received in the House of Representatives, where its members had always been 
elected directly by the people, than in the Senate, where resolutions rarely made their 
way out of committee. See generally id. at 194-214; see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 
141 (“[I]n five out of six congresses, the resolution had been mostly smooth sailing 
through the House. This was certainly not the case in the Senate, where the resolution 
was routinely rejected without ever coming to the floor for a vote.”).  
 46 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 56. 
 47 See id. at 69; see also GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 1041 (Russell & Russell 1960) (1938). 
 48 HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1041. 
 49 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 88. 
 50 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192. 
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legislature could be pressured to disclose in their campaign 
platforms whether they would “abide by the results of the 
general election . . . regardless of party affiliation . . . .”51 This 
modified primary system added teeth to its predecessor and held 
state legislators accountable for implementing the will of the 
people. By 1912, the year the Seventeenth Amendment secured 
passage in both houses of Congress, twelve states were adhering 
to the “Oregon System” and its de facto direct election regime, 
while thirty-three states were using other forms of a primary 
election system.52 Having already “abdicated their federal 
[appointment] responsibilities in favor of the popular expedient,” 
the state legislatures put enormous pressure on Congress to 
heed the public’s calls for democracy.53 
In addition to delegating to the people their 
constitutional duty of choosing senators, state legislatures were 
also calling for a constitutional convention to consider an 
amendment that would open up senatorial elections to the 
popular vote.54 The Constitution requires Congress to organize a 
convention for proposing amendments upon the application of 
two-thirds of the states.55 By 1908, acting on the belief that the 
Senate would not change its electoral procedures on its own, 
twenty-eight states had joined a coordinated effort to call a 
constitutional convention to force the Senate’s hand.56 The fear of 
a constitutional convention, combined with “the fact that most 
senators represented states whose legislatures were on record as 
favoring direct election” proved to be more pressure than the 
Senate could bear.57 On June 12, 1911, after an eighty-six-year 
battle, the Senate finally relented, passing the amendment by a 
sixty-four to fourteen vote.58 Passage in the House followed 
shortly thereafter.59 Finally, on April 8, 1913, the Seventeenth 
Amendment was ratified by the states, becoming the second-
quickest amendment to attain ratification.60 
  
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 109. 
 54 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192. 
 55 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 56 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 193-94. 
 57 Id. at 194. 
 58 Id. at 211-12.  
 59 Id. at 213-14. 
 60 Id. at 214. 
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B. Aims of the Seventeenth Amendment 
While the success in bringing about direct elections was 
aided by a larger movement intent on spreading democracy to 
the people, progressive reformers made their pitch for 
constitutional change by taking aim at the inherent defects 
plaguing the existing appointment system. Specifically, 
reformers pointed to (1) corruption permeating the appointment 
process; (2) the negative influence of the “political machines”; and 
(3) the power of special interests as support for their argument 
that removal of the appointment power from the state 
legislatures was necessary.61 A review of these defects 
underscores the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and 
provides a crucial context in which to assess the current proposal 
to remove the appointment power from state executives.62  
1. Ending Corruption and Bribery 
In rallying the public behind an amendment for direct 
senatorial elections, perhaps no issue had as dramatic an impact 
as the tales of corruption and bribery taking place in the state 
legislative halls throughout the country. There is little question 
that some of these sinister storylines were overexaggerated by 
the “yellow journalists” of the era.63 The pure statistics reveal 
that corruption was far from being as endemic or widespread as 
reformers would have liked the public to believe. In the years 
between 1789 and 1909, there were 1180 senators sent to 
Capitol Hill by the state legislatures. Out of this pool, only 
fifteen faced allegations of corruption, and only seven were 
precluded from serving out their terms.64 Only one of the fifteen 
alleged incidents of corruption took place prior to 1866.65 Thus, 
the remaining fourteen charges were levied, not coincidentally, 
at the same time that the movement towards democratizing 
elections began to gain traction and find its voice.66 Nevertheless, 
  
 61 See, e.g., McInerney, supra note 39, at 168-69; see also Amar, supra note 
11, at 744-45; Brooks, supra note 38, at 200. 
 62 See infra Part III. 
 63 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 97-98. “Yellow journalism” is a term used to 
describe newspapers that used “lurid features and sensationalized news . . . to attract 
readers and increase circulation.” Yellow Journalism, ENCYCLOPEDIABRITTANICA.COM, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/652632/yellow-journalism (last visited Feb. 
1, 2011). 
 64 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 191.  
 65 Id. at 190.  
 66 See id. 
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perception trumped reality as these stories became “much 
publicized and . . . crucial [to] undermining support for the 
original mode of electing senators.”67 
A review of some of the more sensational headline 
stories illustrates the nexus between the corruption scandals of 
the era and the fight for direct elections that was 
simultaneously being waged in Congress. The first infamous 
bribery case occurred in 1899 with the election of Senator 
William Clark from Montana. Having failed in his bid to attain 
office in 1890, a determined Clark devoted his impressive 
resources to mount a successful campaign in 1899.68 On 
December 4, 1899, the same day that Clark was to be admitted 
to the Senate, a petition was filed by members of the Montana 
legislature challenging the “validity of the pretended election” 
on grounds of bribery.69 The complaint alleged that Clark 
appropriated $35,000 for the votes of four state lawmakers, 
with another $175,000 being offered to others for their “votes or 
influence.”70 On May 15, 1900, with overwhelming evidence of 
both Clark’s guilt and “corruption [which] totally pervaded 
Montana politics,” the Senate voted to strip him of his seat.71 
Just four days after being ousted, Montana’s acting governor 
selected none other than embattled ex-Senator William Clark 
to fill the vacant Senate seat.72 Though this action was reversed 
three days later by the absentee governor, Clark was later 
appointed to the Senate in 1901 by a state legislature 
comprised of many of the same lawmakers who had received 
financial support from Clark in the past. This time, he was 
allowed to retain his seat in the Senate.73 
A decade later in 1910, Senator William Lorimer of 
Illinois faced “the most sensationalized, politicized, and 
humiliating investigation in the history of the Senate up to 
that time . . . .”74 The Illinois senator, already one year into his 
term, found himself the subject of a Chicago Tribune article 
containing admissions from state lawmakers that they had 
  
 67 Id. at 191.  
 68 The Election Case of William A. Clark of Montana (1900), U.S. SENATE, http:// 
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/089William_Clark.htm 
[hereinafter Election of Clark] (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 69 Charges in the Clark Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1899. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Election of Clark, supra note 68. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 92.  
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been bribed with cash and portions of a “jackpot” slush fund to 
appoint Lorimer to the Senate.75 Lorimer was cleared of any 
wrongdoing by the Senate based on inconsistent testimony 
among the parties involved and a lack of adequate proof 
necessary to unseat him.76 However, it was the rhetoric of 
dissenting Senator Beveridge of Indiana, a member of 
Lorimer’s own party, which placed the scandal squarely in the 
middle of the ongoing Seventeenth Amendment debate. 
Beveridge blasted the appointment system, stating, “The 
candidate is not on trial. The election is on trial,” and just one 
instance of bribery “makes the whole election foul.”77 By linking 
the corruption scandal with an outmoded method of electing 
senators, progressive reformers came to view the case against 
Lorimer “as a holy crusade.”78  
Adding fuel to the fire, on the eve of the Senate’s 
decision on whether to unseat Lorimer, charges were filed 
against Senator Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin, alleging that 
his seat had been obtained through corruption.79 Stephenson 
was accused of violating primary campaign finance laws, 
making illegal contributions, and offering bribes to assist in the 
procurement of his appointment.80 Like Lorimer, Stephenson 
was exonerated by a majority of senators who believed that 
violations of state primary election laws should not preclude a 
senator from being seated, since the primary system was not a 
part of the constitutional process by which one becomes a 
senator.81 The dissenting senators felt that although state 
legislatures were not legally bound to appoint the winner of a 
primary election, the primary vote did reflect the will of the 
people, and therefore, any corruption in the primary process 
would taint the appointment.82 
  
 75 See Tells of Bribes to Elect Lorimer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1910; see also 
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 94. 
 76 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 94; The Election Case of William Lorimer of 
Illinois (1910; 1912), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ 
contested_elections/095William_Lorimer.htm [hereinafter Election of Lorimer] (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 77 Owen and Beveridge Say Put Lorimer Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1911. 
 78 Election of Lorimer, supra note 76.  
 79 Senator Stephenson Under Bribe Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1911. 
 80 Id. 
 81 The Election Case of Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin (1912), U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/096Isaac_Ste
phenson.htm [hereinafter Case of Stephenson] (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).  
 82 Id. Wisconsin was one of the states using a direct primary system that 
allowed voters to express their choice for senator, thereby exerting political pressure on the 
state legislators to honor their wishes. See id.; see also ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192 n.49. 
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Though Lorimer and Stephenson were both able to 
retain their Senate seats, the debate surrounding their stories 
served as a major impetus for the change in senatorial election 
procedures. Both scandals took place as “public sentiment was 
running high against the use of money and questionable 
practices during state legislatures’ election of senators and 
while Congress was debating the Seventeenth 
Amendment . . . .”83 The tales of scandal, the perception of 
corruption, and the push for direct elections were inextricably 
linked. Indeed, William Lorimer managed to escape expulsion 
during the 61st Congress (which had rebuffed a direct elections 
resolution).84 However, the 62nd Congress, boasting new 
members who had used the scandal to gain political support in 
the previous election cycle, retried the issue and ousted 
Senator Lorimer, marking the only time in history a Senate 
seat had been upheld by one Congress and repealed in the 
next.85 Fair or not, the perception of abuse and corruption 
“aroused suspicion that Senators elected by legislators . . . 
could not be trusted to safeguard the public interest.”86 The 
timing of the scandals alongside the ongoing debate over direct 
elections meant one subject would rarely be discussed without 
mention of the other.87 These headlines helped progressive 
reformers rally the public and pressure Congress into passing 
the Seventeenth Amendment.  
Even where Senate seats were not directly paid for, some 
appointments were nonetheless tainted by the appearance of 
impropriety. Candidates fearful of arousing public suspicion 
through direct bribes could still purchase a seat years in 
advance by “contributing funds in every party contest, [and] 
paying the campaign expenses of [state] legislators who would 
respond to the call in senatorial elections.”88 
For example, the nomination of William Sheehan for the 
New York Senate seat in 1911 was properly condemned for this 
brand of corruption. Sheehan had helped the Tammany 
machine take control of the state legislature through his 
campaign contributions and political endorsements, which 
  
 83 Case of Stephenson, supra note 81.  
 84 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 95. 
 85 See id. at 96. 
 86 HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1041. 
 87 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 92. 
 88 Id. at 99. 
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carried great weight due to his personal celebrity.89 When the 
machine returned the favor by nominating him for the Senate, 
one legislator remarked that “Mr. Sheehan may not be exactly 
the kind of man we believe should be sent to the United States 
Senate, but he has done a lot for the party by turning control of 
the Legislature over to us, and I believe he is entitled to his 
reward.”90 These “rewards,” like the transparent corruption 
present in the Lorimer and Stephenson escapades, motivated 
the framers of the Seventeenth Amendment to put an end to 
the “buying of seats” for good.91  
2. Curbing the Power of the Political Machines 
In the lead-up to the passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, senators were increasingly viewed less as the 
independent and deliberative choice of the state legislature, and 
more as the selection of “party bosses who ruled the legislative 
‘machines.’”92 There was a pervading “skepticism of government 
officials . . . . It was the era of the professional politician, the 
hey-day of the boss.”93 The parliamentary practices of the 
“bosses” fueled the growing distrust of government officials and 
gave rise to a number of concerns regarding the existing 
electoral process.94 One primary concern, which rarely goes 
unmentioned with any discussion of political machines, was 
corruption, an issue that directly led to the ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment.95 Two other issues that served to 
embolden the movement for direct elections were closely linked 
to the influence of the political machines: (1) the blending of 
state and national politics, and (2) legislative deadlocks. 
Prior to passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, party 
leaders discovered that nominating a senator before a state 
election, who would in turn campaign alongside the state 
nominee, could help secure votes for their party.96 This widely 
  
 89 Id. at 100. The “Tammany machine” perpetuated political control over New 
York City through a “blend of charity and patronage,” and became “synonymous with 
urban political corruption.” Tammany Hall, ENCYCLOPEDIABRITTANICA.COM, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/582027/Tammany-Hall (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 90 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 100 (quoting a New York Times article). 
 91 HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1047.  
 92 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 17.  
 93 McInerney, supra note 39, at 166. 
 94 Amar, supra note 11, at 741. 
 95 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 96 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 86.  
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used practice, known as “public canvass[ing],”97 was first 
employed during the Lincoln-Douglas debates for Illinois’s 
Senate seat in 1858. For the state legislators, their decision on 
whether to endorse Lincoln or Douglas was to be “the biggest 
popular issue in the upcoming state elections.”98 As the use of 
canvassing increased throughout the country, many feared that 
the mixture of state and national politics was “overwhelm[ing] 
local issues” and “effecting the state’s legislative business.”99  
Canvassing remained popular until 1913 because it 
allowed a senatorial candidate to “drag a majority of the 
legislators on his coattails,” thereby perpetuating the power of 
the machines.100 However, as a consequence, state officials were 
primarily being chosen for their choice of U.S. Senator, rather 
than their local accomplishments and agenda.101 Voters in local 
elections were “forced to consider both national and state 
issues”102 at the polls, resulting in misrepresentation on both the 
state and national levels.103 Summing up the growing frustrations 
over machine influence, Senator Beveridge stated on the Senate 
floor that “it [has] come[] to pass that Senators actually have 
been . . . selected by the ‘party managers’ . . . . The party boss has 
become more potent than the legislature, or even the people 
themselves, in selecting United States Senators . . . .”104 Two 
years later, direct elections would “put an end to the blurring of 
issues in the election of members of the legislatures . . . .”105 
Legislative deadlock was the other major issue attributed 
to the political machines that served as an impetus for direct 
elections.106 Often times, where one political party controlled the 
state’s assembly and its rival party controlled the state senate, 
the legislative apparatus of the state would come to a 
  
 97 See Brooks, supra note 38, at 207; see also Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and 
Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. 
REV. 1007, 1025 (1994). 
 98 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 87. 
 99 Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the 
Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 165, 200-01 (1997). 
 100 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 89. 
 101 McInerney, supra note 39, at 169.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Brooks, supra note 38, at 200. See McInerney, supra note 39, at 169 (“The 
people are electing [state] officials, not for their abilities, but for their choice of United 
States Senator.”).  
 104 Little, supra note 9, at 641 (quoting Senator Beveridge). 
 105 HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1070. 
 106 See Amar, supra note 11, at 741.  
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standstill.107 Partisan bickering between legislative bodies would 
sometimes leave the citizenry without any representation at all. 
In fact, between 1885 and 1912, there were seventy-one 
legislative deadlocks.108 Of these partisan battles, seventeen 
resulted in a Senate seat remaining unfilled for an entire 
legislative session.109 For example, in Delaware, the people were 
left with only one senator in three different Congresses and with 
none at all from 1901 through 1903.110 At other times, the 
impasse in the state legislative halls led to outbreaks of 
violence.111 As a result of these deadlocks, state legislatures were 
rendered ineffective and Congress suffered from “the absence of 
various state Senators.”112 Thus, legislative deadlocks helped 
bolster support for direct senatorial elections.113 
The candidacy of William Sheehan provides an 
illustration of the corrosive effect that political machines had on 
the levers of government in the years prior to the Seventeenth 
Amendment.114 Sheehan had been nominated by Tammany boss 
Charles Murphy as a reward for his efforts in helping a majority 
of Democrats secure election to the state legislature.115 In turn, 
the state Democrats, pressured by Tammany Hall, pledged to 
cast their votes to send Sheehan to Capitol Hill.116 However, 
“insurgents” from upstate that were not loyal to the Tammany 
machine were ready to break rank and desert Sheehan’s 
candidacy.117 When Republican lawmakers refused to choose 
sides, a six-week deadlock ensued.118 The controversy was only 
brought to an end after Tammany Democrats and the insurgents 
compromised on a different candidate.119 
  
 107 See ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 183.  
 108 Id. at 187. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 90. In 1896, Kentucky’s governor was forced 
to declare martial law in order to quell public outrage over the Senate contest. Id. In 
1905, Colorado’s Republican governor called in troops to confront Denver police who 
supported the Democratic candidate for Senate. Id. And in Missouri in 1905, a fist fight 
broke out on the floor of the assembly when tensions boiled over during a legislative 
stalemate. See Zywicki, supra note 99, at 200.  
 112 McInerney, supra note 39, at 168-69.  
 113 See, e.g., id. 
 114 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
 115 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 100. 
 116 Dix, Worried, Hopes for Another Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1911. 
 117 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 100. 
 118 Id.  
 119 Id. 
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The Sheehan case demonstrates the litany of problems 
associated with party-machine involvement in senatorial 
appointments. First, his nomination was acknowledged as a 
reward for “canvassing,” a practice that resulted in voters 
electing state officials based on their choice of national political 
figures rather than on their local records. Second, the rift 
between Democrats loyal to the Tammany machine and the 
“insurgents” produced a prolonged stalemate that brought the 
state’s legislative process to a standstill. Third, the episode 
could only be settled by compromise on a lesser known 
candidate. Often, legislative deadlocks were broken only by 
nominating “the darkest of the dark horse” candidates, 
ultimately to the detriment of the people.120 Other times, 
deadlocks led to states being completely unrepresented in the 
Senate. Even when seats were eventually filled, the protracted 
battles between the parties “always consumed a great deal of 
state legislative time that was therefore not spent on other 
important state matters . . . .”121 Thus, political-machine 
influence and meddling proved to be another compelling issue 
utilized by reformers to rally the nation behind direct elections.  
3. Reducing the Influence of the Special Interests 
Closely related to the suspicions surrounding political 
machine control over the appointment of senators was the 
alleged influence of big business. Large corporations contributed 
substantial amounts of money to the political parties in each 
state, with donations usually increasing during the years in 
which a federal election was held.122 These funds would then be 
used by the parties to finance their public canvass and mass-
advertising campaigns, and to help elect the state legislators who 
had already pledged their vote for the party’s choice of senator.123 
The Senate as a whole, with at least some members having been 
put into power through the bankrolls of the corporations, became 
labeled by progressive reformers as a “‘millionaire’s club,’ 
beholden to corporate and machine interests.”124 
  
 120 ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 187. 
 121 Id. 
 122 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 103. 
 123 Id. at 105. 
 124 Zywicki, supra note 97, at 1018 (citation omitted); see also McInerney, 
supra note 39, at 169. 
2011] GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION NOT ADVISED 1219 
Like the issue of corruption, however, the influence of 
interest lobbying seems to have been overstated. Many 
corporations donated money not to exercise control over 
senatorial appointments, but merely to compete with their 
business rivals who were simultaneously forking over large 
amounts of money to the machines in an attempt to influence 
local legislation.125 Their only real strategy, therefore, was to be 
seen on the winning team when all was said and done. The 
corporations implemented this strategy by hedging their bets 
and donating to both parties when the election appeared too 
close to call, or by simply withholding funds until a winner was 
all but certain.126 In addition to the lack of real power and 
control over the appointment process, Professor Todd Zywicki 
points out that, contrary to the allegations of the reformers, 
corporate influence over national lawmakers was actually at a 
low point in the late-nineteenth century due to the high 
transactional costs associated with forming a special interest 
contract with the federal government.127 This theory runs 
counter to the characterization of the Senate as a conglomerate 
of individuals indebted and subservient to the corporate 
interests that sent them to Capitol Hill. 
Still, as was true of the corruption issue, perception 
overwhelmed reality and special interest influence helped 
progressive reformers realize their goal of direct elections. 
There was no disputing that special interests were contributing 
to state and local governments, a fact that surely could have 
eroded the public’s confidence in the legislature’s ability to 
appoint the most qualified candidate to represent the state in 
the Senate. In addition, the lack of uniformity in senatorial 
election procedures, along with a disparity in political stability 
between regions, created Senate “Stalwarts” in the East, and a 
constant changeover of senators in the West.128 The stark 
contrast in seniority between the regions provided special 
  
 125 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 104. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Zywicki, supra note 97, at 1038 (arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment 
was passed at the behest of special interest groups). Before 1913, the transaction costs 
of lobbying were “extremely high,” since interest groups were forced to persuade not 
just Congress but also the state legislatures, who could remove a senator who did not 
vote in the “desired manner.” Id. The fact that each house of Congress was accountable 
to a different constituency also “made it more difficult for special-interest ‘factions’ to 
divert the powers of government toward private ends.” Id. at 1034 (citation omitted). 
 128 Zywicki, supra note 99, at 205. These disparities meant that eastern states 
held distinct seniority advantages in Congress, and led to the declining influence of 
western states. Id. 
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interests exercising influence over eastern senators, such as 
the railroad industry, with the ability to procure federal 
funding at a disproportionate level to the detriment of the 
western agrarian interests.129 Thus, it was the western states 
that most actively championed the direct election of senators in 
order to even the special interest playing field.130 Ultimately, 
regardless of whether the special interests truly possessed 
substantial control over the appointment process and 
subsequent policy decisions of the senators, passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment was hailed as a “hard-earned and 
much-needed triumph of ‘the people’ over special interests.”131 
However, the reformers’ victory was not as complete and 
thorough as was once believed. As will be seen in Part III of 
this note, corruption, political influence, and special-interest 
control continue to plague the electoral process of the U.S. 
Senate.  
III. CONCERNS SURROUNDING GUBERNATORIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 
Ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment extended 
democracy to the people by allowing them to choose their 
senators directly, rather than leaving the decision to the 
discretion of state legislatures perceived as incapable of 
handling the responsibility. Still, the framers of the 
amendment left some vestiges of pure representative 
government intact by granting the state executive the power to 
make an appointment when a vacancy arises.132 Since 
ratification in 1913, there have been 188 gubernatorial 
appointments to fill vacant Senate seats.133 Over this time, “the 
process of awarding the [Senate] office has become fraught 
  
 129 Id. at 205-06; cf. Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and 
the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1977 (1994) (“In the 
Midwest, agrarian interests became convinced that only popular election could weaken 
the power that railroads and other corporate interests had over the Senate and end the 
economic discrimination against the region.”). 
 130 Zywicki, supra note 99, at 205-06. Zywicki is careful to note that “western 
politicians did not favor direct election purely because of an ideological commitment to 
democracy and popular government. Rather, westerners favored popular election 
primarily because they saw it as an instrument for increasing their influence in 
Washington and to enact policies designed to further their economic interests.” Id. at 206. 
 131 Zywicki, supra note 97, at 1010 (citation omitted). 
 132 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 133 Appointed Senators, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/ 
history/common/briefing/senators_appointed.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
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with malfeasance and political peril.”134 The same issues that 
progressives exploited to remove appointment power from the 
state legislatures—namely, corruption of the appointers,135 
political party manipulation,136 and special interest 
influence137—are the same issues that have plagued 
gubernatorial Senate appointments since ratification. As a 
consequence, the credibility of both the governors and their 
appointees has been undermined, while public trust in the 
government has eroded. In keeping with the spirit of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, if the response to these evils in 1913 
was “more democracy,”138 then the power to choose our senators 
must once again be removed from politicians and granted 
directly to the people. This part examines the three primary 
issues motivating the Seventeenth Amendment in our modern 
day political context, and demonstrates that the current 
gubernatorial appointment scheme suffers from the same fatal 
flaws that sabotaged the pre-Seventeenth Amendment 
electoral process. 
A.  Gubernatorial Corruption 
It is unknown whether the framers of the Seventeenth 
Amendment believed that state executives were a more-trusted 
source of authority than their colleagues in the legislative 
branch, though this may be presumed based on the appointment 
power having been taken from the legislators and granted to the 
governors.139 Events in the past decade, however, reveal that any 
ethical credit afforded to the state executives was likely 
unwarranted and undeserved. For example, in 2003, Governor 
Edwin Edwards of Louisiana was sentenced to ten years in 
prison after being found guilty on charges of corruption.140 The 
following year, Governor John Rowland of Connecticut was 
forced to step down after pleading guilty to a federal conspiracy 
  
 134 Carl Hulse, Senate Vacancies Leave a String of Sordid Tales, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/us/politics/11senate.html. 
 135 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 136 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 137 See supra Part II.B.3. 
 138 HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 79. 
 139 See Amar, supra note 11, at 743-44 (arguing that governors were given the 
right to make vacancy appointments because they share a common electorate with the 
senators themselves, rather than state legislators who, like candidates for seats in the 
House of Representatives, are subject to election in gerrymandered districts).  
 140 Lauren Johnston, Ex-Governor Talks From Prison, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct. 
16, 2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/16/eveningnews/main578506.shtml. 
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charge.141 In 2005, Governor Bob Taft of Ohio, great-grandson of 
former President William Howard Taft, pled no contest to 
misdemeanor ethics violations.142 In 2006, Governor Don 
Siegelman of Alabama was convicted on bribery and corruption 
charges,143 and Governor George Ryan of Illinois was sentenced 
to prison for racketeering, fraud, and lying under oath.144 In 
2008, Governor Rod Blagojevich of Illinois was ousted from office 
after he allegedly attempted to sell then-President-elect Barack 
Obama’s vacant Senate seat.145 Also in 2008, Governor Elliot 
Spitzer of New York was forced to resign after being implicated 
in a prostitution ring.146 Finally, in 2009, Governor Mark Sanford 
of South Carolina disappeared to Argentina to carry on an 
extramarital affair, allegedly using taxpayer money and 
campaign donations to finance the excursion.147 Sanford faced 
thirty-seven ethics violations that were ultimately settled, 
thereby allowing him to escape impeachment.148 This rundown of 
general gubernatorial corruption within the past decade is not 
meant to characterize all state executives as inherently corrupt. 
Rather, it illustrates that the office of the governor, like the 
state legislative halls at the turn of the century, has been 
tainted by a steady barrage of media reports detailing episodes 
of corruption and ethics violations. It is through this prism that 
gubernatorial appointments to fill vacant Senate seats are now 
being viewed by the public. 
Since ratification, Senate vacancy appointments have 
rarely involved the type of transparent bribery made infamous 
in the cases of William Clark149 and William Lorimer.150 
Governor Rod Blagojevich’s claim that he wasn’t “giving it up 
for [expletive] nothing,” in reference to then-President-elect 
  
 141 Jarrett Murphy, Guilty Plea for Ex-Conn. Governor, CBSNEWS.COM (Dec. 
23, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/06/21/politics/main625031.shtml. 
 142 Dan Balz, Taft Admits Ethics Violations, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2005, http:// 
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 145 See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
 146 See supra note 37. 
 147 Robbie Brown, Gov. Sanford Accepts Fine in Ethics Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
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 149 See supra text accompanying notes 68-73. 
 150 See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.  
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Obama’s vacated Senate seat, provided a rare example of such 
blatant corruption.151 Rather, most of the appointment scandals 
occurring after 1913 have borne a stronger resemblance to the 
type of indirect “rewards” for political favors that were the 
hallmark of the political machine, exemplified in the case of 
William Sheehan.152 For instance, in 1929, Pennsylvania 
Governor John Fisher appointed Senator Joseph Grundy, a 
textile manufacturer who was “an influential backer of 
campaigns, [and] who had contributed heavily to Fisher’s 
campaign.”153 In more recent years, gubernatorial appointments 
have come to be seen as a choice to “reward patrons, install 
relatives, [or to] put in placeholders . . . .”154 
Unmerited appointments have become ever more 
frequent, increasing the urgency to remove the appointment 
power from the state executives. For example, in 2009, Florida 
Governor Charlie Crist selected his “former chief of staff and 
campaign ‘maestro’ George LeMieux,” marking the first time the 
newly appointed senator would hold a public office.155 Critics of 
the appointment, blasting it as an example of “cronyism,” 
quickly responded with a bill that would require special 
elections when a Senate seat is vacated.156 Appointments by 
Louisiana’s Governor Edwin Edwards of his wife in 1972,157 and 
Alaska’s Governor Frank Murkowski of his daughter in 2002,158 
implicate cronyism’s closely related cousin—nepotism. Alaskan 
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Oct. 18, 2009, http://www.allbusiness.com/government/elections-politics-politics-political-
parties/14761561-1.html. 
 156 Alex Leary, Kriseman: End ‘Cronyism’ and Hold Special Elections for U.S. 
Senate Vacancies, BUZZ BLOG OF ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www. 
tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/content/kriseman-end-cryonyism-and-hold 
-special-elections-us-senate-vacancies. 
 157 Jacob Weisberg, Political Corruption Smackdown: Which State Is the Most 
Crooked—Illinois or Louisiana?, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2206523. 
 158 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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voters, like critics in Florida, responded swiftly with a ballot 
initiative to require special elections when a vacancy arises in 
the Senate.159 In Delaware, the appointment of Edward Kaufman 
to fill Vice President-elect Joseph Biden’s Senate seat was 
widely viewed as a mere “placeholder” for Beau Biden, until the 
Vice President’s son returned from military service.160 
Ultimately, both the son and the place-holding Senator declined 
the opportunity to fill the father’s seat by the time the special 
election did occur.161 Nevertheless, the treatment of a Senate seat 
as “a family heirloom” gave ample ammunition for critics of 
vacancy appointments to renew the call for special elections.162 
Polling in the most recent states to incur a Senate 
vacancy suggests immediate dissatisfaction and distrust among 
the electorate after an appointment is made by the governor. In 
New York, according to a poll conducted in September 2009, just 
months after her appointment, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand 
retained a 26% approval rating, while Governor Patterson’s 
approval rating hovered around 17%.163 Newly appointed 
Colorado Senator Michael Bennet, who was controversially 
chosen to replace Senator Ken Salazar, enjoyed an approval 
rating of just 31% according to an August 2009 poll,164 while the 
governor who appointed him held a mere 40% approval rating.165 
  
 159 See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 160 See Perry Bacon, Jr., GOP Eyes Seats of Appointed Senators, WASH. POST, Jan. 
28, 2009; Bill Schneider, Senate Appointments Highlight Messy Process, CNN.COM (Feb. 5, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/05/schneider.senate.appoint/index.html. 
Similarly, in Florida, Governor Charlie Crist’s appointment of George Lemieux was widely 
seen as a placeholder for Crist himself to make a run at the Senate in 2010. See Michael 
Muskal, Marco Rubio Defeats Gov. Charlie Crist in Florida Senate Race, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
2, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/02/news/la-pn-crist-rubio-final. 
 161 GOP Encouraged to Pick Up Senate Seat as Beau Biden Decides Not to 
Follow Dad, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/ 
25/bidens-son-beau-announces-run-senate. 
 162 How Not to Pick a Senator: Three Examples Show Why Vacancies Should Be 
Filled by Special Election, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012303379.html. 
 163 Marist Poll: NYS Voters on White House Involvement in NYS Politics, 
MARIST COLL. INST. FOR PUB. OP. (Sep. 24, 2009), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/ 
misc/nyspolls/ny090922/Complete%20September%2024,%202009%20NYS%20Poll%20Rel
ease%20and%20Tables.pdf. Gillibrand would overcome the initial backlash surrounding 
her appointment and win the special election held in 2010. See Appointee No More: NY’s 
Gillibrand Wins Sen. Seat, WASH. POST.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110206914.html. Governor Patterson, on 
the other hand, never recovered politically and did not seek another term. See Hakim & 
Peters, supra note 36. 
 164 Colorado Senate Pretty Wide Open, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://publicpolicypolling.blogspot.com/2009/08/colorado-senate-pretty-wide-open.html. 
 165 Ritter Still Vulnerable, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Aug. 20, 2009), http:// 
www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP_Release_CO_820925.pdf. Bennet used his time 
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The immediate backlash against vacancy appointments in 
Florida and Massachusetts was felt by Florida Governor Charlie 
Crist, who saw a precipitous decline in his approval ratings from 
60% to 48%,166 and Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, 
whose ratings following his appointment were among “the 
lowest gubernatorial approval ratings in the country” in the 
Democratic stronghold of Massachusetts.167 At a time when, 
according to a December 2010 Gallup poll, Congress’s overall 
approval rating stands at an all-time low of 13%, there exists a 
dramatic need for trust and accountability in government.168 
These goals can only be undermined when Senate vacancies are 
filled by gubernatorial appointments. 
The allegations of self-serving bribery, cronyism, and 
nepotism surrounding the most recent Senate appointments 
have reinvigorated the old debates waged in the run up to 
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. While introducing a 
constitutional amendment to require special elections for vacant 
Senate seats, Senator Russ Feingold drew a parallel between the 
reformers’ fight for direct elections in the previous century, and 
the current slate of appointment controversies, stating: 
[The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment] was the 
culmination of a nearly century-long struggle. The public’s disgust 
with the corruption, bribery, and political chicanery that resulted 
from the original constitutional provision giving State legislatures 
  
in Washington to “establish a solid financial base,” ultimately enabling him to edge out 
Tea Party challenger Ken Buck in the 2010 special election. See Kevin Simpson, Allison 
Sherry & Michael Booth, Bennet Wins in Senate Race, DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.denverpost.com/election2010/ci_16502977. Like his New York counterpart, 
Colorado Governor Bill Ritter did not seek re-election in 2010. See Steven K. Paulson, 
Hickenlooper Defeats Tancredo in Colorado Governor’s Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/hickenlooper-defeats-tanc_n_778004.html.  
 166 Dunkelberger, supra note 155. In 2010, Marco Rubio soundly defeated 
Crist as the two battled to replace Lemieux in the Senate. See Muskal, supra note 160.  
 167 Eamon Javers, Obama Tries to Energize Patrick, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28661.html#. But see Tom Jensen, Our Governor 
Approval Ratings, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Apr. 30, 2009), http://publicpolicypolling. 
blogspot.com/2009/04/our-governor-approval-ratings.html (showing Delaware Governor 
Jack Markell with a 62% job approval rating as recently in April, just months following 
his appointment of Edward Kaufman). Governor Patrick ultimately survived to win re-
election in 2010. See Abby Goodnough, Patrick Hangs on as Massachusetts Governor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03mass. 
html. However, his appointment was rebuked by the electorate as the Senate seat of Ted 
Kennedy fell into Republican hands following Scott Brown’s surprise special election 
victory. See Viser & Estes, supra note 21. 
 168 See Jeffrey M. Jones, Congress’ Job Approval Rating Worst in Gallup History, 
GALLUP.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145238/congress-job-approval-
rating-worst-gallup-history.aspx (“Americans currently hold Congress in lower esteem for 
the job it is doing than at any point in the last 36 years.”).  
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the power to choose United States Senators was a big motivation for 
the amendment. As we have seen in recent months, gubernatorial 
appointments may pose the same dangers. They demand the same 
solution and, that is, direct elections.169 
The perception that governors are ethically incapable of 
choosing the people’s representatives mirrors one of the major 
democratic defects that the framers of the Seventeenth 
Amendment sought to remedy. In keeping with the spirit of the 
amendment, the only solution to the recent wave of corrupt 
appointments is to put democracy back into the hands of the 
people when a vacancy in the Senate arises. 
B.  Party Politics in Senate Appointments 
As was the case prior to the passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, party politics currently has an enormous influence 
on the decision of who will represent the people in the Senate. 
While the amendment’s vacancy provision has cured the 
problem of legislative deadlocks by putting the appointment 
power into the hands of the executive, other vexatious issues 
that plagued the old electoral system continue to frustrate the 
will of the people today. First, the modern day governor is just as 
susceptible to political party power and influence as state 
legislators were to the political machines prior to 1913. Further, 
party influence over gubernatorial appointments and other state 
and local issues blurs the lines between national and local 
politics and engenders confusion among voters. Finally, the 
political chicanery that corroded the legislative appointment 
system continues to have a disproportionate impact on the 
ultimate filling of a vacant Senate seat. The political party 
apparatus wields more power now than ever before, and 
gubernatorial Senate appointments have become a purely 
political process under its direct purview and influence. 
Professor Sanford Levinson raises the possibility that 
the Seventeenth Amendment reformers may have believed that 
removing the appointment power from the “party hacks” in the 
state legislature and vesting it in the executive branch would 
“diminish the relevance of political party identity” surrounding 
  
 169 A Constitutional Amendment Concerning Senate Vacancies: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Member, Sen. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
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senatorial appointments.170 The notion that state executives 
stand above the partisan fray cannot be given any sort of 
credence today, as governors are just as reliant on their party’s 
warchest of campaign capital and political organization as the 
turn-of-the-century legislators were on their political machines. 
For example, in the 2009 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey 
and Virginia, both the Democratic and Republican parties 
“pour[ed] unprecedented amounts of money and muscle” behind 
their party candidates.171 In Virginia, the two parties 
contributed over twenty million dollars in their attempts to 
sway the outcome of the state’s election.172 In New Jersey, the 
Republican National Committee spent another $4.1 million 
backing Chris Christie for governor.173  
Given this reliance on the national party apparatus, it 
would be wishful to think that the governor, entrusted with a 
decision that could sway the balance of power in both the 
Senate and the country, would be insulated from the pressure 
and influence of partisan politics. The statistics refute any such 
idealistic notion. Of the fifty-seven Senate appointments made 
by governors since 1960, only two have resulted in the 
appointment of a senator from the governor’s opposing party.174 
Hall Lusk, a Democrat from Oregon, was sent to Capitol Hill in 
1960 by a Republican governor.175 The only other time a 
governor has chosen a member of the opposing party was 
Democratic Governor Dave Freudenthal’s appointment of 
Republican John Barrasso, a choice forced on him by a 
Wyoming law constraining the governor’s choice to a member of 
the departed senator’s party.176 Governors are no less likely to 
be influenced by their political party affiliation than were the 
legislators of the early twentieth century. As Professor 
Levinson points out, “[t]he fact that modern governors may not 
  
 170 Levinson, supra note 30, at 721.  
 171 David Chalian, National Parties Battle in VA and NJ to Set Stage for 2010, 
ABC NEWS.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dnc-gop-battle-gubernatorial-
races-virginia-jersey-setting/story?id=8768117. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Michael O’Brien, RNC Spends over $13 Million on Va., N.J. Gov. Races, THE 
HILL (Oct. 29, 2008), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/65365-rnc-spends-
over-13-million-on-va-nj-gov-races. 
 174 See Ken Rudin, The Ever-Shrinking Democratic Field for ‘08, NPR.ORG (Dec. 
20, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6653800 (citing only one 
instance where a senator was appointed by a governor from the opposing party, having 
been written prior to Senator Barrasso’s appointment in 2007). 
 175 Id.  
 176 Amar, supra note 11, at 727.  
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be ‘bosses’ does not lessen their identity one whit, by and large, 
as thoroughly political and partisan creatures.”177  
Furthermore, national party entrenchment in state and 
local affairs can blur the lines between national and local politics 
and engender confusion among voters when they elect their 
state officers. As evidenced by spending levels in gubernatorial 
elections, the national political parties and other out-of-state 
political action committees pump enormous amounts of money 
into influencing voters’ decisions regarding in-state affairs.178 
Aside from investments of capital, political parties now practice 
a modern form of “canvassing,” where national political stars 
invade small towns to pledge their support behind the local 
candidates. For instance, during the 2009 election season, 
President Obama and Vice President Biden appeared in New 
Jersey to stump for incumbent governor Jon Corzine,179 while 
big-name Republicans Sarah Palin and Newt Gingrich 
interjected themselves into an obscure upstate New York 
congressional race, hoping to change their party’s national 
profile.180 Attack ads produced and paid for by the political 
parties tying the state candidate to the unpopular policies of 
national political figures are a common sight each fall, as are ads 
attempting to exploit the popularity of a national figure in the 
candidate’s same party. As a result, modern state elections are 
often viewed as a referendum on national party policies rather 
than a vote on pressing local issues.181 
This convergence of state and national party politics 
makes a governor’s appointment decision inherently political, 
as an unpopular appointment could become a determinative 
issue in the next gubernatorial campaign. In 2008, Alaska 
voters ousted incumbent Governor Frank Murkowski in favor 
of Sarah Palin, due in part to the former’s nepotistic 
  
 177 Levinson, supra note 30, at 722. 
 178 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text; see also Olympia Meola, 
Out-of-State Groups Pump $6 Million into Va. Gubernatorial Race, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 19, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/jul/19/cash19_ 
20090718-222406-ar-36842. 
 179 Paul Steinhauser, Clinton Stumps for Corzine, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 20, 
2009), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/10/20/clinton-stumps-for-corzine.  
 180 See Janet Hook, New York Race at Epicenter of GOP a Mutiny, L.A. TIMES, 
Oct. 27, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/nation/na-gop-identity-crisis27. 
 181 See Dana Milbank, Referendum on Obama? Depends on Who Wins, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/02/ 
AR2009110202873.html. 
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appointment of his daughter to the Senate.182 Governor 
Patterson’s appointment of Kirsten Gillebrand, on the other 
hand, was portrayed by the New York Times as “a careful 
political calculation by the governor, who will run for his 
second term as governor in 2010 . . . .”183 The controversies 
surrounding Senate appointments have the potential to 
overwhelm critical local issues that are at stake during a 
gubernatorial campaign and can lead to misrepresentation in 
state government. The blending of national politics in the state 
process was one of the primary reasons for the constitutional 
change to direct elections.184 
Finally, the political stunts and tricks that reformers 
sought to eliminate with passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment remain a plague on the vacancy system. Though 
the power to fill a vacant Senate seat by appointment is the 
exclusive domain of the governor, it is the state legislatures 
that make the initial determination of whether the seat will be 
filled by a special election or a gubernatorial appointment.185 
Therefore, the process of naming a successor remains 
vulnerable to the same influences and political tricks that were 
prevalent before the implementation of direct elections. This 
was acutely demonstrated in Massachusetts, where state 
Democrats in control of the legislature stripped Republican 
Governor Mitt Romney of his appointment powers in 2004,186 
only to reinstitute gubernatorial appointments in 2009 with a 
Democratic governor in charge and a sixty-seat Senate 
supermajority hanging in the balance.187 This brand of political 
manipulation, similar to the practice of “gerrymandering,” 
where state and congressional district lines are redrawn by the 
party in power, is designed to perpetuate party control and 
undermine the will of the people.188 Thus, the party in control of 
  
 182 Alaska Gov. Murkowski Concedes Defeat in GOP Gubernatorial Primary, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,209918,00.html 
(“His approval ratings have skidded over the past four years because of much-criticized 
decisions such as appointing his daughter to his U.S. Senate seat . . . .”). 
 183 Hernandez, Hakim & Confessore, supra note 36. 
 184 See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text. 
 185 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“[T]he executive authority of such State shall 
issue writs of election . . . [p]rovided, That the legislature of any State may empower 
the executive thereof to make temporary appointments . . . .”). 
 186 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.  
 187 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 188 See Amar, supra note 11, at 746. Amar argues that gerrymandered districts 
caused misrepresentation in state legislative halls and led to the appointment of senators 
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the state legislature can still exercise direct and undue 
influence over the choice of the new senator.189  
In 2007, Hawaii recognized these dangers and changed 
its laws to require the governor to select the new senator from 
“the same political party as the prior incumbent.”190 The goal in 
Hawaii was to create an appointment process “free of political 
gamesmanship or controversy” and “ensure the integrity of the 
legislative process.”191 Only Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming192 have 
followed Hawaii’s lead in an attempt to reduce the “potential 
for partisan shenanigans.”193 It is doubtful this potential can 
ever be completely eradicated so long as the modern-day 
political machines continue to exercise enormous influence and 
control over state politics and the replacement of senators.  
C.  Special Interest Influence on the Political Process 
Contrary to the aspirations of the Seventeenth 
Amendment reformers, special interests are more active today 
than ever before in Washington, D.C., and throughout the 
country on the state and local levels. Though campaigns are often 
filled with promises to “change the culture in politics,” a coded 
phrase for eliminating special interest influence over 
legislation,194 Washington remains “a city dominated by influence-
  
who would have otherwise been defeated in state-wide popular elections. Id. Thus, 
gerrymandering was a “largely unnoticed” cause of the change to direct elections. Id. 
 189 See id. at 754 (“[A] legislature could still decide . . . depending on the party 
identity of the governor and the current U.S. Senators, to enact or repeal such a law 
requiring party continuity.”). 
 190 HAW. REV. STAT. § 17-1 (2009). 
 191 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 57, § 1 (2007). 
 192 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(C) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(b) 
(LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (2009). 
 193 Amar, supra note 11, at 754. Still, these statutes do not go far enough, 
since they fail to recognize the will of the independent voter who votes for a person and 
not a party. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44. 
 194 For instance, throughout the course of the 2008 presidential debates, both 
Senator McCain and President Obama made numerous mentions of their records on 
fighting the special interests. President Obama told the country that “we’re going to 
have to change the culture in Washington so that lobbyists and special interests aren’t 
driving the process . . . . The key is whether . . . we’ve got priorities that are working for 
you as opposed to those who have been dictating the policy in Washington lately, and 
that’s mostly lobbyists and special interests.” Transcript of Second McCain, Obama 
Debate, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2011). Senator McCain, during the course of the debates, stated, “I think 
if we get rid of cronyism and special interest influence in Washington . . . we can act 
more effectively.” Id. McCain also touted his record on the issue, telling the country 
that he had “advocated and taken on the special interests.” Id.  
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seeking money and special-interest lobbyists.”195 In fact, as 
Professor Zywicki argues, the advent of direct elections has made 
special interest lobbying prohibitively easier by allowing 
corporations to lobby Congress directly, rather than going 
through the middle-man—the state legislature.196 This theory is 
borne out in the level of influence that big business exerts over 
seemingly every major policy issue on all levels of government 
today. Still, this unintended benefit bestowed on special interest 
groups does not counsel leaving the authority to choose a senator 
in the hands of one person, who in many instances has herself 
been the recipient of corporate and special interest funds. Rather, 
in keeping with the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment, the 
decision should remain in the hands of the people. 
In the years immediately following passage of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, numerous elections were challenged 
on grounds that the victor had used excessive campaign funds, 
often provided by special interest lobbyists. For instance, the 
1926 senatorial election of Thomas Schall in Minnesota, viewed 
as a conflict “between agrarian and industrial interests,” was 
contested on such grounds.197 In 1928, Governor Lennington 
Small of Illinois was forced to make an appointment following 
the Senate’s refusal to seat Colonel Frank L. Smith, the winner 
of the election who stood accused of accepting excessive 
contributions from public utility companies.198 Though Smith was 
ousted due to special interest meddling that had tainted his 
campaign, Governor Small’s subsequent appointment to fill the 
vacant seat was characterized as the product of heavy pressure 
exerted by “large business and agricultural interests.”199 
Supreme Court decisions in the past one hundred years 
have allowed special interest influence to fester and expand 
throughout the country. In Newberry v. United States, 
  
 195 Albert R. Hunt, Some Holdouts to Obama’s Vow to Change Washington, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070 
&sid=aFAPkVN34Kpw (quoting Fred Wertheimer, an advocate for campaign finance reform). 
 196 Zywicki, supra note 99, at 216; see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 106 (“In 
short, the historical trend toward greater popularization of Senate elections, by 
transferring direct responsibility from the legislators to the electorate en masse, had given 
rise to the very conditions which reformers hoped to end with even more popularization.”). 
 197 The Election Case of Magnus Johnson v. Thomas D. Schall of Minnesota (1926), 
U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/ 
106Johnson_Schall.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 198 The Election Case of Frank L. Smith of Illinois (1928), U.S. SENATE, http:// 
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/110Frank_Smith.htm 
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 199 Gov. Small Asked to Name Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1928. 
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automobile magnate Henry Ford challenged the 1918 election of 
Senator Truman Newberry on grounds that his excessive 
campaign expenditures violated federal law.200 The Court struck 
down the statute, which attempted to regulate campaign 
financing in primary elections.201 Since that decision, the Court 
has undercut similar attempts to regulate the influx of special 
interest capital into the electoral process. In Buckley v. Valeo, 
the Court struck down portions of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act that attempted to place a ceiling on campaign 
expenditures by individuals and groups, as an infringement of 
First Amendment political expression.202 Though the Court has 
upheld caps on campaign contributions,203 its attempt to balance 
the “problem of large campaign contributions . . . where the 
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified” while 
simultaneously allowing for “free . . . independent political 
expression”204 has left an open window for special interest groups 
to influence public policy. This window was blown open in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, where the 
Supreme Court struck down a portion of the McCain-Feingold 
Act that prohibited corporations and unions from making 
independent expenditures to advocate for the election or defeat 
of a particular candidate.205 The landmark decision was 
immediately criticized by President Obama as “a major victory 
for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and 
the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day 
in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”206 
  
 200 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 245 (1921). 
 201 Id. at 258. 
 202 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (holding that the prevention of the 
“appearance of corruption” was not a sufficient justification for expenditure limits); see 
also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1996) 
(where a plurality held that the Republican party’s expenditure on radio attack ads 
was an independent expenditure and thus not subject to federal contribution limits). 
The absence of coordination between the party and its candidate regarding the 
advertising campaign rendered the expenditure “independent” and took it out of the 
realm of a regulated “contribution.” Id. at 614. The expenditure was therefore 
guaranteed First Amendment protection. Id. 
 203 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392-93 (2000) 
(distinguishing limits on expenditures from contribution caps on the grounds that 
“‘limitations on independent expenditures are less directly related to preventing 
corruption’ than contributions are”) (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 
518 U.S. at 615). 
 204 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. 
 205 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (“Government may not suppress political speech on the 
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
 206 Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html. 
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The presidential criticism of the Supreme Court 
represented the growing distrust on the part of an American 
public that has witnessed the disproportionate influence that 
special interest groups have exerted over its representatives in 
recent years. For example, in 2009, the website Politico reported 
that companies and financial institutions that had received 
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) funds from the federal 
government were using portions of the taxpayers’ money to 
lobby the same politicians who had given them the money in the 
first instance.207 In defense of this practice, a spokesperson for 
General Motors said, “[W]e have an obligation to remain 
engaged at the federal and state levels and to have our voice 
heard in the policymaking process.”208 Just as potential changes 
in the regulation of the financial system attracted the attention 
and money of special interests, so too did the debates 
surrounding reform of the nation’s health care system. The war 
over health care legislation, which played out publicly as a 
debate between Democrats and Republicans, was being waged 
behind the scenes by pharmaceutical companies and labor 
unions against health insurance companies and business 
groups.209 The White House reportedly sided with the former, 
reaching a deal with the pharmaceutical companies whereby it 
would veto any act of Congress that would extract any more 
than the $80 billion in cost reductions over ten years already 
promised by the pharmaceutical industry.210 In exchange, the 
Democrats would receive industry support and $150 million in 
advertising contributions to support the health care initiative.211 
Despite yearly campaign promises, the quid-pro-quo business of 
Washington politics has not changed. Echoing the words of 
Abraham Lincoln, Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio 
bemoaned special interest control over the health care debate 
and other policy issues in the nation’s capital, stating: 
Is this the best we can do . . . guaranteeing at least $50 billion in 
new business for the insurance companies . . . but the government 
won’t negotiate with the pharmaceutical companies which will drive 
  
 207 Jeanne Cummings, From Under TARP, Banks Add Lobbying, POLITICO 
(July 28, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25497.html.  
 208 Id. 
 209 Associated Press, ‘Special Interests’ on Both Sides in Health Fight, 
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 19, 2009), http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/32479506/ns/politics-health_ 
care_reform. 
 210 David D. Kirkpatrick, White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/health/policy/06insure.html. 
 211 Associated Press, supra note 209.  
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up pharmaceutical costs. Is this the best we can do . . . [Then] we 
have to ask some hard questions about our political system . . . 
Government of the people, or government by the corporations?212 
While special interest influence has expanded in the 
federal arena since passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,213 
it remains endemic on the state and local level as well. For 
instance, in the 2009 New Jersey gubernatorial race, 
challenger Chris Christie took in $401,700 from business 
groups, with nearly $60,000 coming from medical device 
companies.214 His opponent, incumbent governor Jon Corzine, 
received money from a variety of interests, including business 
groups, law firms, and state employees.215 In Florida, Governor 
Charlie Crist, who had appointed George LeMieux to fill a 
vacant Senate seat,216 took in a record $4 million in the first 
fifty days after announcing his own bid to run for the Senate.217 
Although federal and state laws limit contributions to a 
candidate, lobbyists and politicians like Crist have been able to 
circumvent the laws by using a practice known as “bundling.”218 
It was LeMieux who defended the practice of bundling 
contributions in 2008 before he was appointed senator, even 
where it would “sweep[] in donations from troubled businesses 
or the money of out-of-staters with no apparent interest in the 
election.”219 And in Massachusetts, Governor Deval Patrick 
stood accused of using a conduit known as the “Seventy-First” 
fund to evade state campaign contribution laws.220 The scandal 
  
 212 111 Cong. Rec. H3962 (Oct. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich), 
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dzzVppah_mg. 
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Campaign Funds from Special Interests, STAR LEDGER, Oct. 11, 2009, http://www.nj. 
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 217 Beth Reinhard, Governor Charlie Crist’s Senate Campaign Reaps Benefits 
from Bundling of Donations, MIAMIHERALD.COM (July 22, 2009), http://www.tampa 
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 218 Id. “Bundling” allows lobbyists constrained by state law caps on 
contributions to exceed the threshold by pooling together contributions from different 
sources. Id. For instance, in Florida, state law caps a lobbyist’s contributions to a 
political campaign at $2400. However, a Jacksonville lobbyist was able to contribute 
$139,250 to Governor Crist by pooling contributions from his corporate clients. Id.  
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Far from Florida, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.tampabay.com/ 
news/politics/state/article778639.ece. 
 220 See Frank Phillips, Patrick Fund-Raising Arrangement Skirts Law: Donations 
Channeled Through Democratic Party, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.boston.com/ 
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forced the governor’s own party to pass a new state ethics law 
to close loopholes that had allowed him to circumvent the 
contribution caps,221 just three months before his senatorial 
appointment at the height of the national health care debate.222  
Despite modest attempts at limiting the ability of special 
interest groups to influence public policy, there is still ample 
opportunity for massive corporate donations on both the federal 
and state levels. Prior to passage of the Seventeenth 
Amendment, it was the state legislators who were accused of 
being under the influence of special interest lobbyists.223 Today, 
all politicians, including governors, have proven to be equally 
incapable of resisting the expansive war chests of big business. 
Thus, there is legitimate concern that lobbyists can exercise 
undue influence over a governor’s senatorial appointment. This 
is added reason, in keeping with the intent of the framers of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, to transfer the power of replacing a 
vacant Senate seat back into the hands of the people. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
The Supreme Court, by affirming a particularly 
egregious use of the gubernatorial appointment power in 
Valenti v. Rockefeller, has upheld its validity against 
constitutional challenge.224 In Valenti, voters brought an action 
against Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, challenging 
his authority to appoint a successor for Senator Robert F. 
Kennedy following the assassination of the Senator.225 New 
York’s election law required that a vacancy be filled by a 
special election to occur at the annual November elections, so 
long as sixty days had passed between the vacancy and the 
primary election.226 However, since Robert Kennedy died on 
June 6, 1968, and New York held its primary elections within 
the same month, a replacement could not be named until the 
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elections of November 1969.227 To add insult to the voters’ 
injury, New York election law required that special elections 
for Senate seats take place in even-numbered years.228 
Therefore, voters would have to wait until November 1970, a 
full twenty-nine months after the vacancy was created, to 
democratically elect their representative in the Senate.229 
Construing the two-year appointment of a senator as merely 
“temporary,” and therefore compliant with the Seventeenth 
Amendment, the district court held the delay was justified by 
the legitimate government interests in maximizing voter 
turnout,230 allowing the parties and candidates proper time to 
finance a campaign,231 and retaining a primary election 
system.232 In reaching its conclusions, the court found there to 
be “no fundamental imperfection in the functioning of 
democracy.”233 The dissent found these justifications to be 
“exaggerated” and “too remote and unsubstantial to warrant 
the resulting denial of the popular will.”234 To the dissent, the 
Seventeenth Amendment’s unmistakable command for popular 
sovereignty rendered the twenty-nine month period that voters 
would have to wait to choose their senator a betrayal of “the 
revered principle of government ‘by the people.’”235 
The justifying interests identified in Valenti and 
accepted by the Supreme Court become even less compelling in 
the current political environment. Voter turnout is far easier to 
promote today with advancements in communication 
technology and grassroots “get out the vote” campaigns, not to 
mention the twenty-four hour cable news cycle which covers 
elections like horse races and brings heightened awareness to 
key issues throughout the country.236 Nor is the expense of 
financing a campaign a compelling justification for depriving 
the people of their right to vote. The reach of the national party 
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apparatus, political action committees, and the internet have 
helped place viable candidates before the public in rapid 
turnaround time.237 Furthermore, the interest in retaining 
special election primaries stands in contradiction to the goal of 
controlling expense to the candidates and the parties.238 If mere 
expense is sufficient reason to forestall the right to vote, then 
conducting a special election without a primary would reduce 
this burden and still provide for popular sovereignty. Promptly 
filling vacancies and saving taxpayer money have also been 
identified by other courts as legitimate government interests 
that are sufficient to remove the right to vote from the people.239 
Yet time spent giving the people the right to choose their 
leaders has not been an impediment to the House of 
Representatives, where special elections are required when a 
vacancy arises.240 Taxpayer expense should also not be sufficient 
reason to burden the right to vote and deprive those same 
taxpayers of a basic democratic tenet.241  
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Four states have attempted to strike a balance between 
the state’s interests and the people’s right to vote by allowing 
gubernatorial appointments, but constraining the choice to a 
member of the departed senator’s political party.242 These 
statutes make the questionable assumption that retaining 
party continuity is an accurate reflection of the will of the 
people. However, they do not take into account the possibility 
that the vacant Senate seat may have been created due to a 
scandal implicating the political party as a whole.243 Further, 
they ignore the will of the independent voter who votes for a 
person rather than for a party.244 In short, these statutes are 
quick-fix solutions that miss the major issue with 
gubernatorial appointments: they deprive people of the right to 
choose, an essential component of popular sovereignty. Perhaps 
nothing illustrates the importance of the right to choose better 
than the “American Rule,” applied by a majority of courts, 
which upholds votes for a deceased candidate on grounds that 
it reflects the people’s choice to disavow another candidate in 
favor of creating a vacancy.245 Whether a voter’s motivation is to 
send a preferred candidate to Washington, or simply to choose 
to prevent a less desired candidate from getting there, the 
element of choice has been fundamental to our form of 
government since passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
As the “[j]udge of the Elections, Returns, and 
Qualifications of its own Members,”246 the onus to reform a broken 
system falls exclusively to Congress. Senator Russ Feingold, 
leading the charge for a constitutional amendment, invoked the 
struggle of the Seventeenth Amendment reformers, stating, “it 
seems obvious to us that the Senate should be elected by the 
people, [but] the struggle for that right was not easy or fast. But 
the cause was just and in the end the call for direct elections was 
too strong to be ignored.”247 If the cause was just in the early 
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twentieth century, then it is certainly a just cause today. 
Corruption, or at least strong appearances of impropriety in 
gubernatorial appointments, remain prevalent and undermine 
faith and trust in the government.248 Political chicanery and 
gamesmanship continue to disproportionately influence who will 
represent the people in the Senate.249 Special interests, often 
chided as the enemy of democracy, are stronger and more 
powerful now than they ever were prior to direct elections.250 
At a time when the country is so sharply and evenly 
divided over a range of critical issues, the notion of unelected 
senators deciding matters of national importance violates the 
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and offends our democratic 
principles. The time has come for Congress to put an end to 
gubernatorial Senate appointments and ensure once again a 
government of the people, by the people, and for the people. 
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